Saturday, January 2, 2021

Socialism Will Inevitably Lead to Dictatorship and Will Inevitably Fall under the Control of the Worst Individuals

The Road to Serfdom, by F. A. Hayek, is a masterly performance of the job it undertakes. That job is to show by general and historical reasoning, the latter primarily with reference to the course of events in Germany, two things: first, that any such policy as socialism, or planned economy, will inevitably lead to totalitarianism and dictatorship; and second that such a social order will inevitably fall under the control of “the worst” individuals. The argument is naturally political rather than economic, except in the indirect sense that the problems solved, the functions performed, by the open-market system of organization are economic and they cannot be solved, or performed by government under a free political order, nor the open-market system itself maintained under a democratic political regime. There is little or no economic theory in the book. The fifteen short chapters ably describe the old liberalism and contrast it with current tendencies which are virtually antithetical and discuss such problems as individualism, democracy, the rule of law, security and freedom, the place of truth in political and social life, the relation between material conditions and ideal ends, and the problem of international order.

—Frank Knight, appendix to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 2, The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents, definitive ed., by F. A. Hayek, ed. Bruce Caldwell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 249.


Thursday, December 31, 2020

The Various Kinds of Collectivism, Communism, Fascism Differ in the Nature of THE GOAL Toward Which They Want to Direct the Efforts of Society

The common features of all collectivist systems may be described, in a phrase ever dear to socialists of all schools, as the deliberate organization of the labors of society for a definite social goal. That our present society lacks such “conscious” direction toward a single aim, that its activities are guided by the whims and fancies of irresponsible individuals, has always been one of the main complaints of its socialist critics.

In many ways this puts the basic issue very clearly. And it directs us at once to the point where the conflict arises between individual freedom and collectivism. The various kinds of collectivism, communism, fascism, etc., differ among themselves in the nature of the goal toward which they want to direct the efforts of society. But they all differ from liberalism and individualism in wanting to organize the whole of society and all its resources for this unitary end and in refusing to recognize autonomous spheres in which the ends of the individuals are supreme. In short, they are totalitarian in the true sense of this new word which we have adopted to describe the unexpected but nevertheless inseparable manifestations of what in theory we call collectivism. 

The “social goal,” or “common purpose,” for which society is to be organized is usually vaguely described as the “common good,” the “general welfare,” or the “general interest.”

—F. A. Hayek, The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 2, The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents, definitive ed., ed. Bruce Caldwell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 100.


Wednesday, December 30, 2020

Goods (and Services) Price Inflation and Asset Price Inflation Are the Two Forms of MONETARY DISEASE that PLAGUE the Modern Economy

The writers of the Maastricht Treaty had no knowledge about the disease of asset price inflation let alone any prophetic vision of its potential threat to the survival of their cherished monetary union. The monetary constitution in the Treaty was put together by a committee of central bankers who made low inflation (euphemistically described as ‘price stability’), as measured exclusively in the goods and services markets, the key objective. The famed monetarist Bundesbankers of the 1970s (subsequently described in this volume as ‘the Old Bundesbankers’) had departed the scene to be replaced by politicos and econometricians. 

The Old Bundesbankers, in fairness to their successors, also had no clear understanding of asset price inflation. But they did instinctively realize that strict monetary base control (MBC) in which interest rates were free of manipulation was essential to overall monetary stability in a wide sense (which transcended the near-term path of goods and services prices). Instinctively they applied a doctrine of pre-emption. According to this the pursuance of strict monetary control would mean less danger of various forms of hard-to-diagnose economic disease (possibly as yet unclassified), including those characterized by excessive financial speculation, with their origin in monetary disequilibrium. 

The intuition of the monetarist Bundesbankers took them one stage further than Milton Friedman’s famous pronouncement that ‘inflation [goods and services] is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon’. Indeed, we should say the same about asset price inflation. Goods (and services) price inflation and asset price inflation are the two forms of monetary disease that plague the modern economy. They have their joint source in money ‘getting out of control’.

—Brendan Brown, Euro Crash: How Asset Price Inflation Destroys the Wealth of Nations, 3rd ed. (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), Kobo e-book. 


Sunday, December 27, 2020

The Gold Standard Is the Enemy of Big Government Because It Prohibits Inflation for the Purpose of Monetizing Debt

 During the time we were on a gold standard federal deficits were very small or nonexistent. Money that the government did not have, it could not spend nor could it create. Taxing the people the full amount for extravagant expenditures would prove too unpopular and a liability in the next election. 

Justifiably, the people would rebel against such an outrage. Under the gold standard, inflation for the purpose of monetizing debt is prohibited, thus holding government size and power in check and preventing significant deficits from occurring. The gold standard is the enemy of big government. In time of war, in particular those wars unpopular with the people, governments suspend the beneficial restraints placed on the politicians in order to inflate the currency to finance the deficit. Strict adherence to the gold standard would prompt a balanced budget, yet it would still allow for “legitimate” borrowing when the people were willing to loan to the government for popular struggles. This would be a good test of the wisdom of the government’s policy. 

Finally, the inflationary climate has encouraged huge deficits to be run up by governments at all levels, as well as by consumers and corporations. The unbelievably large federal contingent liabilities of over $11 trillion are a result of inflationary policies, pervasive government planning, and unwise tax policies.

—Ron Paul and Lewis Lehrman, The Case for Gold: A Minority Report of the U.S. Gold Commission (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007), 155.


For Rothbard, Reaganomics Is a Blend of Monetarism and Fiscal Keynesianism Swathed in Classical Liberal and Supply-Side Rhetoric

 It is, furthermore, too late for gradualism. The only solution was set forth by F. A. Hayek, the dean of the Austrian School, in his critique of the similarly disastrous gradualism of the Thatcher regime in Great Britain. The only way out of the current mess is to “slam on the brakes,” to stop the monetary inflation in its tracks. Then, the inevitable recession will be sharp but short and swift, and the free market, allowed its head, will return to a sound recovery in a remarkably brief time. Only a drastic and credible slamming of the brakes can truly reverse the inflationary expectations of the American public. But wisely the public no longer trusts the Fed or the federal government. For a slamming on of the brakes to be truly credible, there must be a radical surgery on American monetary institutions, a surgery similar in scope to the German creation of the rentenmark which finally ended the runaway inflation of 1923. One important move would be to denationalize the fiat dollar by returning it to be worth a unit of weight of gold. A corollary policy would prohibit the Federal Reserve from lowering reserve requirements or from purchasing any assets ever again; better yet, the Federal Reserve System should be abolished, and government at last totally separated from the supply of money. 

In any event, there is no sign of any such policy on the horizon. After a brief flirtation with gold, the Presidentially appointed U.S. Gold Commission, packed with pro-fiat money Friedmanites abetted by Keynesians, predictably rejected gold by an overwhelming margin. Reaganomics—a blend of monetarism and fiscal Keynesianism swathed in classical liberal and supply-side rhetoric—is in no way going to solve the problem of inflationary depression or of the business cycle. 

—Murray N. Rothbard, preface to the 4th edition of America's Great Depression, 5th ed. (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2008), xxi-xxii.


The Razzle-Dazzle of Reaganomics Was Supposed to Reverse Inflationary Expectations; the Gradualism Was to Eliminate Inflation without Recession

The Reagan administration knew, of course, that inflationary expectations had to be reversed, but where they miscalculated was relying on propaganda without substance. Indeed, the entire program of Reaganomics may be considered a razzle-dazzle of showmanship about taxes and spending, behind which the monetarists, in control of the Fed and the Treasury Department, were supposed to gradually reduce the rate of money growth. The razzle-dazzle was supposed to reverse inflationary expectations; the gradualism was to eliminate inflation without forcing the economy to suffer the pain of recession or depression. Friedmanites have never understood the Austrian insight of the necessity of a recession to liquidate the unsound investments of the inflationary boom. As a result, the attempt of Friedmanite gradualism to fine-tune the economy into disinflation-without-recession went the way of the similar Keynesian fine-tuning which the monetarists had criticized for decades. Friedmanite fine-tuning brought us temporary “disinflation” accompanied by another severe depression.

In this way, monetarism fell between two stools. The Fed’s cutback in the rate of money growth was sharp enough to precipitate the inevitable recession, but much too weak and gradual to bring inflation to an end once and for all. Instead of a sharp but short recession to liquidate the malinvestments of the preceding boom, we now have a lingering chronic recession coupled with a grinding, continuing stagnation of productivity and economic growth. A pusillanimous gradualism has brought us the worst of both worlds: continuing inflation plus severe recession, high unemployment, and chronic stagnation. 

—Murray N. Rothbard, preface to the 4th edition of America's Great Depression, 5th ed. (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2008), xx-xxi.