Showing posts with label The Clash of Economic Ideas: The Great Policy Debates and Experiments of the Last Hundred Years. Show all posts
Showing posts with label The Clash of Economic Ideas: The Great Policy Debates and Experiments of the Last Hundred Years. Show all posts

Sunday, March 28, 2021

Hayek’s Constancy of Nominal Spending Rule (Keep MV Constant) Made Him Doubt the Merits of the Gold Standard and Free Banking

Hayek noted that a hypothetical gold monetary system in which the money stock consisted exclusively of gold coins (without bank-issued money) would poorly approximate his norm because the stock of monetary gold would not adjust promptly to offset changes in velocity. Gold accumulated slowly from additional mining following a rise in the relative price of gold. Nor would a system with bank-issued money approximate it well, he thought, unless a central bank existed to promptly offset any changes in the volume of bank-issued money not warranted by velocity changes. Thus Hayek was more ambivalent than Mises regarding the merits of the gold standard and free banking. 

—Lawrence H. White, “The Roaring Twenties and Austrian Business Cycle Theory,” in The Clash of Economic Ideas: The Great Policy Debates and Experiments of the Last Hundred Years (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 83-84.


Hayek Wants NOT a Constant Money Supply BUT a Neutral Money Supply Insuring that There Will Be NO Monetary Causes of Price Changes

The Mises-Hayek business cycle theory led Hayek to the conclusion that intertemporal coordination is best maintained by constancy of nominal spending or “the total money stream.” In terms of the variables of Irving Fisher’s equation of exchange (MV=PQ), nominal spending is the money stock times its velocity of circulation, MV. In Prices and Production Hayek recommended that to keep MV constant the money stock M should vary to offset changes in the velocity of money V, but should be constant in the absence of changes in V. The price level P should be allowed to fall with growth in real income Q. As Hansen summarized the prescription:

The supply of money should, therefore, be kept constant, except for such increases or decreases as may be necessary to offset . . . changes in the velocity of circulation . . . Hayek wants, therefore, not a constant money supply, but a neutral money supply — one which will insure that there will be no monetary causes of price changes.

—Lawrence H. White, “The Roaring Twenties and Austrian Business Cycle Theory,” in The Clash of Economic Ideas: The Great Policy Debates and Experiments of the Last Hundred Years (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 83.


Sunday, February 2, 2020

Only Free Banking Would Have Rendered the Market Economy Secure Against Crises and Depressions

Mises blamed unwarranted credit expansion on political pressures for cheap money that the central bank failed to resist. As an institutional reform to avoid the problem he favored free banking, a monetary system without a  central bank, although he acknowledged that the spread of central banking throughout Europe in previous decades had made the choice between free banking and central banking one of those “questions that have long been regarded as closed.” Exemplified by Scotland, Sweden, Canada, Switzerland, and other countries in the periods before their central banks were created, free banking meant a system in which decentralized and competitive commercial banks issue the paper currency, tied down by a contractual obligation to redeem their notes for gold or silver coin.

Advocates of free banking argued that competition would prevent all the banks from colluding to expand in concert, and interbank redemption of excess notes or deposits would restrain any smaller set of banks from overexpanding. International redemption would restrain the system as a whole. In his later treatise Human Action Mises wrote along these lines:
Free banking is the only method for the prevention of the dangers inherent in credit expansion. It would, it is true, not hinder a slow credit expansion, kept within very narrow limits, on the part of cautious banks which provide the public with all the information required about their financial status. But under free banking it would have been impossible for credit expansion with all its inevitable consequences to have developed into a regular — one is tempted to say normal — feature of the economic system. Only free banking would have rendered the market economy secure against crises and depressions.
—Lawrence H. White, The Clash of Economic Ideas: The Great Policy Debates and Experiments of the Last Hundred Years (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 74-75.