—Thomas J. DiLorenzo, Hamilton’s Curse: How Jefferson’s Archenemy Betrayed the American Revolution—and What It Means for America Today (New York: Crown Forum, 2008), 127.
Showing posts with label Hamilton’s Curse: How Jefferson’s Archenemy Betrayed the American Revolution—and What It Means for America Today. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hamilton’s Curse: How Jefferson’s Archenemy Betrayed the American Revolution—and What It Means for America Today. Show all posts
Tuesday, May 19, 2020
The Era of Free Banking Ended when the neo-Hamiltonians (Republicans) Established Their “Unqualified Government Monopoly”
The era of free banking was abruptly ended when the neo-Hamiltonian Republicans passed three Legal Tender Acts, beginning in February 1862. These acts of legislation permitted the treasury secretary to issue paper currency (greenbacks) that was not immediately redeemable in gold or silver. Then they passed the National Currency Acts of 1863 and 1864, which created a system of nationally chartered (and regulated) banks that could issue currency. A punitive 10 percent tax was placed on state-chartered banks in order to drive them into bankruptcy. The neo-Hamiltonians were candid about their intention to create an “unqualified government monopoly,” though they rather absurdly claimed that this would allow “all Americans to share in the advantages of the monopoly.” In reality, monopoly is bad for consumers, whether it is a monopoly in steel production, computers, petroleum, or currency. There is no such thing as a “good” monopoly from the consumers’ perspective.
According to Hummel and Timberlake, the “Free Banking Era” Was the Most Stable Banking System in American History
Despite all the Hamiltonians’ efforts, the Jeffersonians more or less prevailed for decades. The government remained relatively small and decentralized. By the mid-1850s tariff rates were as low as they would be for the entire nineteenth century, and federal subsidies for “internal improvements” were all but nonexistent. The Bank of the United States was dismantled in the 1830s. The American banking system was dominated by state-chartered banks that issued currency backed by gold and silver on demand and that therefore did not inflate their currency beyond what their specie reserves justified. It was not a perfect system, of course, but two highly reputable economic historians, Jeffrey Hummel and Richard Timberlake, have made compelling cases that it was the most stable banking system the United States has ever had. . . .
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A nationalized banking system was one key element of Alexander Hamilton’s agenda that the Lincoln regime resurrected. It did not seem to matter that such a system had been tried twice, with the First and Second Banks of the United States, and each time had created economic instability and corruption. Nor did it matter that during what economists call the “free banking era,” which began when the Second Bank of the United States was dissolved in the 1830s, the purchasing power of American currency remained stable. This stability resulted precisely because the money supply was denationalized. State governments took a more or less laissez-faire attitude toward banking; about half did not even require a state government charter for individuals who wanted to start a bank, accept deposits, and issue banknotes. Banks, then, were “regulated” mainly by competition in the marketplace: a bank that printed too much currency and did not hold sufficient specie reserves would eventually fail. Such failures did occur, but they remained localized and never caused a national bank panic or depression, as has been the case with nationalized banking systems. Panics and depressions are what economists refer to as “contagion effects” of centralized or nationalized banking.
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A nationalized banking system was one key element of Alexander Hamilton’s agenda that the Lincoln regime resurrected. It did not seem to matter that such a system had been tried twice, with the First and Second Banks of the United States, and each time had created economic instability and corruption. Nor did it matter that during what economists call the “free banking era,” which began when the Second Bank of the United States was dissolved in the 1830s, the purchasing power of American currency remained stable. This stability resulted precisely because the money supply was denationalized. State governments took a more or less laissez-faire attitude toward banking; about half did not even require a state government charter for individuals who wanted to start a bank, accept deposits, and issue banknotes. Banks, then, were “regulated” mainly by competition in the marketplace: a bank that printed too much currency and did not hold sufficient specie reserves would eventually fail. Such failures did occur, but they remained localized and never caused a national bank panic or depression, as has been the case with nationalized banking systems. Panics and depressions are what economists refer to as “contagion effects” of centralized or nationalized banking.
—Thomas J. DiLorenzo, Hamilton’s Curse: How Jefferson’s Archenemy Betrayed the American Revolution—and What It Means for America Today (New York: Crown Forum, 2008), 124, 126-127.
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