Sidney and Beatrice Webb Praised the “Cult of Science” of the Soviet Union and Hoped that Scientific Planning Would Save Britain from the Depression

Thus in their two volume work Soviet Communism: A New Civilization? Fabian socialists Sidney and Beatrice Webb praised the “Cult of Science” that they had discovered on their visits to the Soviet Union, and held out the hope that scientific planning on a massive scale was the appropriate medicine to aid Britain in its recovery from the depression. The sociologist Karl Mannheim, who fled Frankfurt in 1933 and ultimately gained a position on the LSE faculty, warned that only by adopting a comprehensive system of economic planning could Britain avoid the fate of central Europe. For Mannheim, planning was inevitable; the only question was whether it was going to be totalitarian or democratic. These economists were joined by other highly respected public intellectuals, from natural scientists to politicians.

If planning was the word on everyone’s lips, very few were clear about exactly what it was to entail. The situation was well captured by Hayek’s friend and LSE colleague Lionel Robbins, who in 1937 wrote:

“Planning” is the grand panacea of our age. But unfortunately its meaning is highly ambiguous. In popular discussion it stands for almost any policy which it is wished to present as desirable. . . . When the average citizen, be he Nazi or Communist or Summer School Liberal, warms to the statement that “What the world needs is planning,” what he really feels is that the world needs that which is satisfactory.

—Bruce Caldwell, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 2, The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents; The Definitive Edition, by F. A. Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 8-9.

If One Cannot Fight the Nazis One Ought at Least Fight the Ideas Which Produce Nazism

The expanded scope and the inherent difficulties of the material covered in the “Scientism” essay were partly responsible for the slowdown, but it was also due to Hayek’s decision to begin focusing on another project. He announced this in his holiday letter to Machlup, begun in December 1940 in Cambridge (where by this time Hayek had, with the assistance of John Maynard Keynes, secured rooms at King’s College) and finished on New Year’s Day 1941 in Tintagel on the Cornish coast: “at the moment I am mainly concerned with an enlarged and somewhat more popular exposition of the theme of my Freedom and the Economic System which, if I finish it, may come out as a sixpence Penguin volume.” By the summer Hayek would report that a “much enlarged” version of the pamphlet was “unfortunately growing into a full fledged book.” Finally, by October 1941 Hayek told Machlup that he had decided to devote nearly all of his time to what would become The Road to Serfdom:

It [the “Scientism” essay] is far advanced, but at the moment I am not even getting on with that because I have decided that the applications of it all to our own time, which should some day form volume II of The Abuse and Decline of Reason, are more important. . . . If one cannot fight the Nazis one ought at least fight the ideas which produce Nazism; and although the well-meaning people who are so dangerous have of course no idea of it, the danger which comes from them is none the less serious. The most dangerous people here are a group of socialist scientists and I am just publishing a special attack on them in Nature—the famous scientific weekly which in recent years has been one of the main advocates of “planning.”

Hayek’s change in course is understandable. He had begun his great book just as Europe was going to war. Western civilisation itself was at stake, and given that the British government would not allow him to participate directly, writing a treatise on how the world had come to such an awful state was to be Hayek’s war effort, the best he could do “for the future of mankind.” Two years later the prospects for the allies seemed brighter, but a new danger was looming. Hayek increasingly feared that the popular enthusiasm for planning, one that had only increased during the war, would affect postwar policy in England. The Road to Serfdom was intended as a counterweight to these trends. Working on it became his first priority, even if it meant delaying his more scholarly treatment of the historical origins and eventual spread of the doctrines that had in his estimation led to the abuse and decline of reason.

—Bruce Caldwell, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 13, Studies on the Abuse and Decline of Reason: Text and Documents, by F. A. Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 6-8.

Socialist Economists Erroneously Assume Various Forms of Knowledge to be Given and Display an Excessive Preoccupation with Stationary Equilibrium

In response to socialists who proposed that central planning required only that the planners solve the appropriate set of Walrasian equations, Hayek described the proposal as “humanly impracticable and impossible” and characterized its proponents as having failed to perceive the real nature of the problem. Socialist economists erroneously assumed various forms of knowledge to be “given” when in reality such knowledge is only discovered by people engaged in the competitive process. Moreover, much knowledge is dispersed and specific to time and place, and much knowledge is not transmissible but tacit, pertaining not so much to “what is” as to “how to.” Socialist economists displayed an “excessive preoccupation with the conditions of a hypothetical state of stationary equilibrium,” but actual economies are dynamic, undergoing constant change. Aiming to abolish profits, the socialists overlooked the essential role of profits as an equilibrating force. “To assume that it is possible to create conditions of full competition without making those who are responsible for the decisions pay for their mistakes seems to be pure illusion.”

—Robert Higgs, review of The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 10, Socialism and War: Essays, Documents, Reviews, by F. A. Hayek, Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 1, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 82.

N. Scott Arnold Demonstrates that Market Socialist Models Possess Systematic Exploitation, NOT the Classic Capitalist Firm

 N. Scott Arnold’s book does not address the history of real existing socialism and the disappointment of these regimes to deliver on their revolutionary promise. This is a work in political, philosophical and economic appraisal of the model of market socialism as offered by the leading theoretical proponents of that system. The economic framework employed to critically assess the model of market socialism is one of the new institutional economics, with a special emphasis on the work on the theory of the firm and contracting (as represented in the work of Coase, Alchian, Demsetz, Williamson and Milgrom and Roberts, but also including an examination of the political process and bureaucracy (as represented in the work of Terry Moe). This makes perfect sense because the focus of the study is on the market socialist claim that workers’ control systems can eliminate the exploitation endemic to capitalist production. What Arnold demonstrates is that it is market socialist models that possess systematic exploitation, not the classic capitalist firm. The well-known concept of opportunism in the new institutionalist literature is employed here to show that it is cooperatives that offer numerable opportunities for opportunism, while the classic capitalist firm has found ways to police this problem.

—Peter J. Boettke, review of The Philosophy and Economics of Market Socialism: A Critical Study, by N. Scott Arnold, Public Choice 91, nos. 3-4 (June 1997): 417-418.

For Mises, Monetary Equilibrium, Like Equilibrium in General, Happens at the INDIVIDUAL Level

Mises’s individualist conception of equilibrium stands in stark contrast to Wicksell’s reliance on broad measures of macroeconomic aggregates. For Mises, the only equilibrium concept that applies to the real world is the plain state of rest. The plain state of rest is a strictly individual condition that is attained after each successful market transaction, when a particular want is fulfilled. It occurs repeatedly during the course of market operations as actors fulfill specific wants, then disappears as market conditions change and new wants are pursued. Individual states of equilibrium, or rest, can only be meaningfully aggregated up to the level of market clearing. That is, markets clear when all participants achieve a plain state of rest. Of course, this aggregate state disappears as quickly as do the individual states. Equilibrium in any broader sense is a useful concept only as an aid to understanding the goal of the market process: if the goal of action is the satisfaction of human wants, then action would cease only when all wants are fulfilled. This final state of rest is an unattainable condition since every change in economic conditions changes the nature of this state. It is a target constantly in flux, always aimed at but never hit.

For Mises, then, monetary equilibrium, like equilibrium in general, happens at the individual level. Each actor wants to keep a cash balance on hand for future transactions, both planned and contingent. This desired cash balance constitutes the individual’s money demand and is based on that individual’s subjective valuation of holding money as compared to their valuation of obtaining more goods or services with that money. The amount of money the individual actually has on hand constitutes his supply of money. Through their spending behavior, individuals will attempt to equate their desired and actual cash holdings.

—Kenneth A. Zahringer, “Monetary Disequilibrium Theory and Business Cycles: An Austrian Critique,” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 15, no. 3 (Fall 2012): 309-310.

The Subject of the Thesis for Hayek’s Second Doctorate Degree Was the Theory of the Imputation of Value

The subject matter was a complete departure from his preparatory studies at the University of Vienna, where the subject of the thesis for his second doctorate degree was the theory of Zurechnung, the imputation of value. His approach to economics was firmly rooted in the Austrian tradition of the subjective theory of value and marginal utility, where the value of any good was derived from the necessarily subjective demand of individuals. But, as Hayek wrote in an essay published in 1926, “The doctrine of marginal utility makes it possible to equate the subjective value of economic goods with a certain level of utility yielded by them if the good yields this utility directly and in isolation. . . . However, this principle is not immediately applicable to those goods which cannot by themselves satisfy certain needs and wants but which are able to do so only in combination with other economic goods. . . . [T]he problem of the derivation of the value of the individual producer goods from the jointly produced level of utility has entered into the economic literature under the name of Zurechnung (in English, imputation). . . .” And not to underestimate the difficulty, Hayek announces, “Consequently, the whole of economic theory rests on the explanation of the value of producer goods and thus on the theory of imputation.” It is not then surprising that Hayek consistently finds the consequences of monetary imbalances in adverse changes in the relative prices of producer and consumer goods.

—Stephen Kresge, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 5, Good Money, Part I: The New World, by F. A. Hayek (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), 5.

It Is the Delay in this Adaptation of the Economy Due to Wage and Price Rigidities that Gives Rise to Secondary Deflation

Having thus disposed of the necessity of deflation, how then did, in Hayek’s view, a secondary deflation develop and what would have been an adequate policy response to it? Here the crucial element is the existence of wage and price rigidities:

There can be little question that these rigidities tend to delay the process of adaptation and that this will cause a ‘secondary’ deflation which at first will intensify the depression but ultimately will help to overcome these rigidities. 

From this passage (and similar ones) we can conclude that the remedying effect of the (primary) depression could be successfully fulfilled, were it not for the obstacle of rigid wages and prices. In turn, it is the delay in this adaptation of the economy due to rigidities that gives rise to secondary deflation. 

—Hansjoerg Klausinger, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 8, Business Cycles, Part II, by F. A. Hayek (Carmel, IN: Liberty Fund, 2017), 9-10.

The Depression Represents an Adjustment Process; This Process Can, BUT NEED NOT, Be Accompanied by Deflation

Just at the time when Hayek had entered the scene as an economic theorist in Great Britain, the economies of the major industrial countries found themselves in the midst of what came to be known as the Great Depression, characterised by a slump in production, high rates of unemployment, and a all in prices accompanied by a shrinking circulation of money. As soon as the fall in prices made itself felt, a debate on the proper reaction in terms of monetary policy evolved, in particular on whether the authorities should respond with expansionist policies and relation. Indeed, policies for preventing and counteracting deflation appeared to follow from Hayek’s stance, too, as neutral money to a first approximation corresponded to a policy of stabilising monetary circulation. Yet, as is well known, Hayek—like most of the economists close to the Austrian school—refrained from any such proposals and was extremely cautious with regard to expansionist monetary policies. Therefore a crucial question to be addressed is how Hayek conceived of the phenomenon of deflation and why he remained so hostile to anti-deflation policies.

In order to answer this question it is necessary to reconstruct Hayek’s approach to deflation. To recapitulate, according to Hayek’s theory the crisis is caused by a maladjustment in the structure of production typically initiated by a credit boom, such that the period of production (representing the capitalistic structure of production) is lengthened beyond what can be sustained by the rate of voluntary savings. The necessary reallocation of resources and its consequences give rise to crisis and depression. Thus, the ‘primary’ cause of the crisis is a kind of ‘capital scarcity’ while the depression represents an adjustment process by which the capital structure is adapted. This process can, but need not, be accompanied by deflation. It is in this specific meaning that Hayek speaks of deflation as being ‘secondary’, for example, when referring to “these (in a methodological sense) secondary complications which arise during the depression”, or maintains that “the process of deflation represents only a secondary phenomenon”. It should also be clear that Hayek was propounding the definition of deflation then prevailing in Austrian circles, that is, deflation as a decrease in (the circulation of) money as opposed to the more common meaning of a decrease in prices (or the price level).

—Hansjoerg Klausinger, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 8, Business Cycles, Part II, by F. A. Hayek (Carmel, IN: Liberty Fund, 2017), 5-6.

According to Hayek and the Austrians a RELATIVE INFLATION Characterised the American Boom of the 1920s, Especially after 1927

The distinction between Hayek’s emphasis on relative prices and the preoccupation of the ‘stabilisation theorists’ with the price level is brought out most clearly when considering a steadily progressive economy. Here, unlike the stationary economy, the output (of consumers’ goods) is growing over time, in the simplest case due to technical progress that steadily increases the total productivity of the factors of production. Then a constant circulation of money makes the price level decline inversely to the rate of productivity growth. In fact, advocacy of such a ‘productivity norm’ for price-level behaviour was not novel. As pointed out by Robbins, such was “not the esoteric creed of a handful of ‘sadistic deflationists’”, but the opinion of many economists of repute like Marshall, Edgeworth, Taussig, Hawtrey, Robertson, and Pigou. Yet, it was Hayek’s major and novel contribution to argue for this norm as a requirement of neutrality and thus as a means to prevent the trade cycle, whereas the older economists often had rested their case on considerations of equity. 

Looking at the market for loanable funds, in order to keep prices stable in the face of growing output money must be injected into the circulation. In particular, when money is injected by credit creation this constitutes an additional supply of credit beyond that of voluntary saving, and for this additional supply to be absorbed by demand, the interest rate must fall below its equilibrium level. Yet, this is just the situation that will give rise to an unsustainable boom, and thus to the trade cycle. In the terminology of Haberler’s study this case is one of ‘relative inflation’. According to Hayek and the Austrians such a relative inflation characterised the American boom of the 1920s, especially after 1927, and consequently the stabilisation of the price level in the face of buoyant growth in productivity was to blame for causing the crisis of 1929 and eventually the Great Depression.

—Hansjoerg Klausinger, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 7, Business Cycles, Part I, by F. A. Hayek (Carmel, IN: Liberty Fund, 2017), 35-36.