Keynes’s Doctrines Take Us Back to the Pre-Scientific Stage of Economics When the Whole Working of the Price Mechanism Was Not Yet Understood

I cannot help regarding the increasing concentration on short-run effects—which in this context amounts to the same thing as a concentration on purely monetary factors—not only as a serious and dangerous intellectual error, but as a betrayal of the main duty of the economist and a grave menace to our civilisation. To the understanding of the forces which determine the day-to-day changes of business, the economist has probably little to contribute that the man of affairs does not know better. It used, however, to be regarded as the duty and the privilege of the economist to study and to stress the long effects which are apt to be hidden to the untrained eye, and to leave the concern about the more immediate effects to the practical man, who in any event would see only the latter and nothing else. The aim and effect of two hundred years of continuous development of economic thought have essentially been to lead us away from, and ‘behind’, the more superficial monetary mechanism and to bring out the real forces which guide long-run development. I do not wish to deny that the preoccupation with the ‘real’ as distinguished from the monetary aspects of the problems may sometimes have gone too far. But this can be no excuse for the present tendencies which have already gone far towards taking us back to the pre-scientific stage of economics, when the whole working of the price mechanism was not yet understood, and only the problems of the impact of a varying money stream on a supply of goods and services with given prices aroused interest. It is not surprising that Mr. Keynes finds his views anticipated by the mercantilist writers and gifted amateurs: concern with the surface phenomena has always marked the first stage of the scientific approach to our subject. But it is alarming to see that after we have once gone through the process of developing a systematic account of those forces which in the long run determine prices and production, we are now called upon to scrap it, in order to replace it by the short-sighted philosophy of the business man raised to the dignity of a science.

—F. A. Hayek, The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 12, The Pure Theory of Capital, ed. Lawrence H. White (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007), 368.

Sidney and Beatrice Webb Praised the “Cult of Science” of the Soviet Union and Hoped that Scientific Planning Would Save Britain from the Depression

Thus in their two volume work Soviet Communism: A New Civilization? Fabian socialists Sidney and Beatrice Webb praised the “Cult of Science” that they had discovered on their visits to the Soviet Union, and held out the hope that scientific planning on a massive scale was the appropriate medicine to aid Britain in its recovery from the depression. The sociologist Karl Mannheim, who fled Frankfurt in 1933 and ultimately gained a position on the LSE faculty, warned that only by adopting a comprehensive system of economic planning could Britain avoid the fate of central Europe. For Mannheim, planning was inevitable; the only question was whether it was going to be totalitarian or democratic. These economists were joined by other highly respected public intellectuals, from natural scientists to politicians.

If planning was the word on everyone’s lips, very few were clear about exactly what it was to entail. The situation was well captured by Hayek’s friend and LSE colleague Lionel Robbins, who in 1937 wrote:

“Planning” is the grand panacea of our age. But unfortunately its meaning is highly ambiguous. In popular discussion it stands for almost any policy which it is wished to present as desirable. . . . When the average citizen, be he Nazi or Communist or Summer School Liberal, warms to the statement that “What the world needs is planning,” what he really feels is that the world needs that which is satisfactory.

—Bruce Caldwell, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 2, The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents; The Definitive Edition, by F. A. Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 8-9.

If One Cannot Fight the Nazis One Ought at Least Fight the Ideas Which Produce Nazism

The expanded scope and the inherent difficulties of the material covered in the “Scientism” essay were partly responsible for the slowdown, but it was also due to Hayek’s decision to begin focusing on another project. He announced this in his holiday letter to Machlup, begun in December 1940 in Cambridge (where by this time Hayek had, with the assistance of John Maynard Keynes, secured rooms at King’s College) and finished on New Year’s Day 1941 in Tintagel on the Cornish coast: “at the moment I am mainly concerned with an enlarged and somewhat more popular exposition of the theme of my Freedom and the Economic System which, if I finish it, may come out as a sixpence Penguin volume.” By the summer Hayek would report that a “much enlarged” version of the pamphlet was “unfortunately growing into a full fledged book.” Finally, by October 1941 Hayek told Machlup that he had decided to devote nearly all of his time to what would become The Road to Serfdom:

It [the “Scientism” essay] is far advanced, but at the moment I am not even getting on with that because I have decided that the applications of it all to our own time, which should some day form volume II of The Abuse and Decline of Reason, are more important. . . . If one cannot fight the Nazis one ought at least fight the ideas which produce Nazism; and although the well-meaning people who are so dangerous have of course no idea of it, the danger which comes from them is none the less serious. The most dangerous people here are a group of socialist scientists and I am just publishing a special attack on them in Nature—the famous scientific weekly which in recent years has been one of the main advocates of “planning.”

Hayek’s change in course is understandable. He had begun his great book just as Europe was going to war. Western civilisation itself was at stake, and given that the British government would not allow him to participate directly, writing a treatise on how the world had come to such an awful state was to be Hayek’s war effort, the best he could do “for the future of mankind.” Two years later the prospects for the allies seemed brighter, but a new danger was looming. Hayek increasingly feared that the popular enthusiasm for planning, one that had only increased during the war, would affect postwar policy in England. The Road to Serfdom was intended as a counterweight to these trends. Working on it became his first priority, even if it meant delaying his more scholarly treatment of the historical origins and eventual spread of the doctrines that had in his estimation led to the abuse and decline of reason.

—Bruce Caldwell, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 13, Studies on the Abuse and Decline of Reason: Text and Documents, by F. A. Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 6-8.

The Subject of the Thesis for Hayek’s Second Doctorate Degree Was the Theory of the Imputation of Value

The subject matter was a complete departure from his preparatory studies at the University of Vienna, where the subject of the thesis for his second doctorate degree was the theory of Zurechnung, the imputation of value. His approach to economics was firmly rooted in the Austrian tradition of the subjective theory of value and marginal utility, where the value of any good was derived from the necessarily subjective demand of individuals. But, as Hayek wrote in an essay published in 1926, “The doctrine of marginal utility makes it possible to equate the subjective value of economic goods with a certain level of utility yielded by them if the good yields this utility directly and in isolation. . . . However, this principle is not immediately applicable to those goods which cannot by themselves satisfy certain needs and wants but which are able to do so only in combination with other economic goods. . . . [T]he problem of the derivation of the value of the individual producer goods from the jointly produced level of utility has entered into the economic literature under the name of Zurechnung (in English, imputation). . . .” And not to underestimate the difficulty, Hayek announces, “Consequently, the whole of economic theory rests on the explanation of the value of producer goods and thus on the theory of imputation.” It is not then surprising that Hayek consistently finds the consequences of monetary imbalances in adverse changes in the relative prices of producer and consumer goods.

—Stephen Kresge, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 5, Good Money, Part I: The New World, by F. A. Hayek (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), 5.

It Is the Delay in this Adaptation of the Economy Due to Wage and Price Rigidities that Gives Rise to Secondary Deflation

Having thus disposed of the necessity of deflation, how then did, in Hayek’s view, a secondary deflation develop and what would have been an adequate policy response to it? Here the crucial element is the existence of wage and price rigidities:

There can be little question that these rigidities tend to delay the process of adaptation and that this will cause a ‘secondary’ deflation which at first will intensify the depression but ultimately will help to overcome these rigidities. 

From this passage (and similar ones) we can conclude that the remedying effect of the (primary) depression could be successfully fulfilled, were it not for the obstacle of rigid wages and prices. In turn, it is the delay in this adaptation of the economy due to rigidities that gives rise to secondary deflation. 

—Hansjoerg Klausinger, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 8, Business Cycles, Part II, by F. A. Hayek (Carmel, IN: Liberty Fund, 2017), 9-10.

The Depression Represents an Adjustment Process; This Process Can, BUT NEED NOT, Be Accompanied by Deflation

Just at the time when Hayek had entered the scene as an economic theorist in Great Britain, the economies of the major industrial countries found themselves in the midst of what came to be known as the Great Depression, characterised by a slump in production, high rates of unemployment, and a all in prices accompanied by a shrinking circulation of money. As soon as the fall in prices made itself felt, a debate on the proper reaction in terms of monetary policy evolved, in particular on whether the authorities should respond with expansionist policies and relation. Indeed, policies for preventing and counteracting deflation appeared to follow from Hayek’s stance, too, as neutral money to a first approximation corresponded to a policy of stabilising monetary circulation. Yet, as is well known, Hayek—like most of the economists close to the Austrian school—refrained from any such proposals and was extremely cautious with regard to expansionist monetary policies. Therefore a crucial question to be addressed is how Hayek conceived of the phenomenon of deflation and why he remained so hostile to anti-deflation policies.

In order to answer this question it is necessary to reconstruct Hayek’s approach to deflation. To recapitulate, according to Hayek’s theory the crisis is caused by a maladjustment in the structure of production typically initiated by a credit boom, such that the period of production (representing the capitalistic structure of production) is lengthened beyond what can be sustained by the rate of voluntary savings. The necessary reallocation of resources and its consequences give rise to crisis and depression. Thus, the ‘primary’ cause of the crisis is a kind of ‘capital scarcity’ while the depression represents an adjustment process by which the capital structure is adapted. This process can, but need not, be accompanied by deflation. It is in this specific meaning that Hayek speaks of deflation as being ‘secondary’, for example, when referring to “these (in a methodological sense) secondary complications which arise during the depression”, or maintains that “the process of deflation represents only a secondary phenomenon”. It should also be clear that Hayek was propounding the definition of deflation then prevailing in Austrian circles, that is, deflation as a decrease in (the circulation of) money as opposed to the more common meaning of a decrease in prices (or the price level).

—Hansjoerg Klausinger, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 8, Business Cycles, Part II, by F. A. Hayek (Carmel, IN: Liberty Fund, 2017), 5-6.

According to Hayek and the Austrians a RELATIVE INFLATION Characterised the American Boom of the 1920s, Especially after 1927

The distinction between Hayek’s emphasis on relative prices and the preoccupation of the ‘stabilisation theorists’ with the price level is brought out most clearly when considering a steadily progressive economy. Here, unlike the stationary economy, the output (of consumers’ goods) is growing over time, in the simplest case due to technical progress that steadily increases the total productivity of the factors of production. Then a constant circulation of money makes the price level decline inversely to the rate of productivity growth. In fact, advocacy of such a ‘productivity norm’ for price-level behaviour was not novel. As pointed out by Robbins, such was “not the esoteric creed of a handful of ‘sadistic deflationists’”, but the opinion of many economists of repute like Marshall, Edgeworth, Taussig, Hawtrey, Robertson, and Pigou. Yet, it was Hayek’s major and novel contribution to argue for this norm as a requirement of neutrality and thus as a means to prevent the trade cycle, whereas the older economists often had rested their case on considerations of equity. 

Looking at the market for loanable funds, in order to keep prices stable in the face of growing output money must be injected into the circulation. In particular, when money is injected by credit creation this constitutes an additional supply of credit beyond that of voluntary saving, and for this additional supply to be absorbed by demand, the interest rate must fall below its equilibrium level. Yet, this is just the situation that will give rise to an unsustainable boom, and thus to the trade cycle. In the terminology of Haberler’s study this case is one of ‘relative inflation’. According to Hayek and the Austrians such a relative inflation characterised the American boom of the 1920s, especially after 1927, and consequently the stabilisation of the price level in the face of buoyant growth in productivity was to blame for causing the crisis of 1929 and eventually the Great Depression.

—Hansjoerg Klausinger, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 7, Business Cycles, Part I, by F. A. Hayek (Carmel, IN: Liberty Fund, 2017), 35-36.

Something Had Gone Wrong with the Steering Mechanism of Federal Reserve Policy and It Behooves Us to Know Why

The reason why all this deserves attention is that we now know that the Titanic of the US financial system in 1923 was even then on course for the iceberg of 1929. Something had gone wrong with the steering mechanism of Federal Reserve policy and it behooves us to know why. At several points in his review of US monetary policy in the early 1920s (chapter 2, this volume), Hayek raised warning flags, particularly in section six, which points to the lack of a coherent theoretical foundation. 

What went wrong? The Reserve Board was no longer able to use changes in the reserve ratio as the steering mechanism. “Under the present conditions, with gold embargoes in force in most foreign countries and the United States practically the only free gold market of the world, the movement of gold to this country does not reflect the relative position of the money markets nor does the movement give rise to corrective influences, working through exchanges, money rates, and price levels, which tend to reverse the flow. The significance which movements in the reserve ratios formerly possessed rested upon the fact that they were the visible indicators of the operation of the nicely adjusted mechanism of international finance. With this mechanism now inoperative, the ratios have lost much of their value as administrative guides. It has therefore been necessary for banking administration even in those countries that have been most successful in maintaining a connection with the gold standard to develop or devise other working bases.”

—Stephen Kresge, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 5, Good Money, Part I: The New World, by F. A. Hayek (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), 22.

The Central Problem: How the Existence of Non-permanent Resources Increases the Permanent Income Stream

The non-permanent nature of all ‘wasting assets’ creates a problem which is not dealt with in the theory of timeless production. These assets cannot be directly used to contribute to the output of the time when they have ceased to exist. Insofar as their existence does help to maintain output permanently above the level at which it could be kept with the help of the permanent resources alone, it must do so in an indirect manner. If the fact that we have command over resources which remain useful only for a limited period of time did not help us to use the services of the permanent resources more effectively, it would be quite impossible to keep our income permanently above the level where it would stay if these non-permanent resources had never been available. We might stretch their use over a longer period of time, but ultimately we should inevitably exhaust them and should then have to be content with what services the permanent resources could render by themselves. It is this problem of why the existence of a stock of non-permanent resources enables us to maintain production permanently at a higher level than would be possible without them, which is the peculiar problem connected with what we call capital.

—F. A. Hayek, The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 12, The Pure Theory of Capital, ed. Lawrence H. White (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007), 74.

Hayek Also Distinguishes Between (a) Factors that Yield Fixed Streams of Service Each Period and (b) Factors Whose Use Today Diminishes their Future Usefulness

The second important distinction is between (a) factors that yield fixed streams of service each period—namely, simple labor and permanent non-labor input sources—and (b) factors whose use today diminishes their future usefulness and raises the problem of maintenance. The first group of factors, apart from labor, can be called economic “land” goods, whether given by nature (David Ricardo’s “original and indestructible powers of the soil”) or manmade (Hayek’s example in The Pure Theory of Capital was a railroad tunnel that will need no maintenance once excavated). The second group encompasses all impermanent capital goods, from one-use blasting caps to depletable natural resource deposits to imperfectly durable machines. The simplified production model of Prices and Production treated all value-adding inputs, being applied in consecutive stages to advance intermediate goods toward final consumption, as coming from type (a) factors. The model reduced type (b) factors, impermanent capital goods, to intermediate goods. Knight’s model neglected impermanent capital goods in a different way. Its construct of a perpetual capital stock implied that the maintenance or replacement of any impermanent tools is automatic, embodied in the decision about the permanent level of future consumption.

—Lawrence H. White, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 11, Capital and Interest, by F. A. Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), xxv.

Hayek Distinguishes Between (a) INHERITED Capital Goods and (b) Intermediate Goods or Capital Goods TO BE PRODUCED

For Hayek’s model there are two important distinctions among factors of production. The first distinction is between (a) inherited capital goods, or goods already existing at the moment that a production plan is being made, and (b) intermediate goods, or capital goods (of greater or lesser permanence) to be produced as part of a sequence of production steps leading to final output. Hayek’s exposition in Prices and Production neglected inherited capital goods. It depicted the first production stage as involving only land and labor, which created intermediate goods that then progress through subsequent production stages toward final sales. Knight’s model, by abstracting from roundabout production, abstracts entirely from intermediate goods. It offers only undifferentiated capital (the inherited Crusonia plant), which instantly yields consumption.

—Lawrence H. White, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 11, Capital and Interest, by F. A. Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), xxv.

Socialism Will Inevitably Lead to Dictatorship and Will Inevitably Fall under the Control of the Worst Individuals

The Road to Serfdom, by F. A. Hayek, is a masterly performance of the job it undertakes. That job is to show by general and historical reasoning, the latter primarily with reference to the course of events in Germany, two things: first, that any such policy as socialism, or planned economy, will inevitably lead to totalitarianism and dictatorship; and second that such a social order will inevitably fall under the control of “the worst” individuals. The argument is naturally political rather than economic, except in the indirect sense that the problems solved, the functions performed, by the open-market system of organization are economic and they cannot be solved, or performed by government under a free political order, nor the open-market system itself maintained under a democratic political regime. There is little or no economic theory in the book. The fifteen short chapters ably describe the old liberalism and contrast it with current tendencies which are virtually antithetical and discuss such problems as individualism, democracy, the rule of law, security and freedom, the place of truth in political and social life, the relation between material conditions and ideal ends, and the problem of international order.

—Frank Knight, appendix to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 2, The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents, definitive ed., by F. A. Hayek, ed. Bruce Caldwell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 249.

The Various Kinds of Collectivism, Communism, Fascism Differ in the Nature of THE GOAL Toward Which They Want to Direct the Efforts of Society

The common features of all collectivist systems may be described, in a phrase ever dear to socialists of all schools, as the deliberate organization of the labors of society for a definite social goal. That our present society lacks such “conscious” direction toward a single aim, that its activities are guided by the whims and fancies of irresponsible individuals, has always been one of the main complaints of its socialist critics.

In many ways this puts the basic issue very clearly. And it directs us at once to the point where the conflict arises between individual freedom and collectivism. The various kinds of collectivism, communism, fascism, etc., differ among themselves in the nature of the goal toward which they want to direct the efforts of society. But they all differ from liberalism and individualism in wanting to organize the whole of society and all its resources for this unitary end and in refusing to recognize autonomous spheres in which the ends of the individuals are supreme. In short, they are totalitarian in the true sense of this new word which we have adopted to describe the unexpected but nevertheless inseparable manifestations of what in theory we call collectivism. 

The “social goal,” or “common purpose,” for which society is to be organized is usually vaguely described as the “common good,” the “general welfare,” or the “general interest.”

—F. A. Hayek, The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 2, The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents, definitive ed., ed. Bruce Caldwell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 100.

Money by Its Very Nature Constitutes a Kind of Loose Joint in the Self-Equilibrating Apparatus of the Price Mechanism

But even without further continuing the discussion of the rôle money plays in this connection, we are certainly entitled to conclude from what we have already shown that the extent to which we can hope to shape events at will by controlling money are much more limited, that the scope of monetary policy is much more restricted, than is today widely believed. We cannot, as some writers seem to think, do more or less what we please with the economic system by playing on the monetary instrument. In every situation there will in fact always be only one monetary policy which will not have a disequilibrating effect and therefore eventually reverse its short-term influence. That it will always be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to know exactly what this policy is does not alter the fact that we cannot hope even to approach this ideal policy unless we understand not only the monetary but also, what are even more important, the real factors that are at work. There is little ground for believing that a system with the modern complex credit structure will ever work smoothly without some deliberate control of the monetary mechanism, since money by its very nature constitutes a kind of loose joint in the self-equilibrating apparatus of the price mechanism which is bound to impede its working—the more so the greater is the play in the loose joint. But the existence of such a loose joint is no justification for concentrating attention on that loose joint and disregarding the rest of the mechanism, and still less for making the greatest possible use of the short-lived freedom from economic necessity which the existence of this loose joint permits. On the contrary, the aim of any successful monetary policy must be to reduce as far as possible this slack in the self-correcting forces of the price mechanism, and to make adaptation more prompt so as to reduce the necessity for a later, more violent, reaction.

—F. A. Hayek, The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 12, The Pure Theory of Capital, ed. Lawrence H. White (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007), 367.

The Type of Economy Determines the “Propagation Mechanism,” How the Economy Reacts to Monetary or Real “Impulses”

The crucial property of a money economy is that, absent neutral money, a divergence of investment from voluntary saving becomes possible. In particular, Hayek considers an excess of investment over saving, financed by credit creation (inflation), as the root cause of maladjustments in the structure of production and thus ultimately of the crisis. These maladjustments will arise irrespective of whether the exogenous change that generates excessive investment originates from the monetary or the real side. Or put in terms of the interest rate criterion: It does not matter if a discrepancy comes about by a fall in the money rate or a rise in the natural rate—the former resulting from a policy of monetary expansion, the latter from an increase in the (expected) rate of profit, possibly due to technical progress. Indeed, Hayek in Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle stressed fluctuations in the natural rate (relative to an unchanged money rate) as the typical impulse, while later on in Prices and Production he started the analysis of maladjustments from assuming a fall in the money rate. Framing the problem—anachronistically—in terms of Ragnar Frisch’s famous distinction, the type of economy—money or barter—determines the propagation mechanism, that is, how the economy reacts to impulses, be they monetary or real. According to Hayek it is the distinguishing property of a (non-neutral) money economy that it will not react to such impulses by an immediate tendency towards equilibrium.

—Hansjoerg Klausinger, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 7, Business Cycles, Part I, by F. A. Hayek (Carmel, IN: Liberty Fund, 2017), 19-20.

This Is the ONLY Sense in Which It is Proper to Speak of a MONETARY Explanation of the Business Cycle

Introducing Prices and Production in 1935, Hayek contrasted the two main pillars of his theory of the cycle,  “the monetary factors which cause the trade cycle” and “the real phenomena which constitute it.” In the following we will keep to this distinction and first concentrate on money as the prime cause of the cycle before turning to the changes in the structure of production as the crucial cyclical mechanism. 

As already noted, Hayek maintains that cycles and crises are possible only in a money economy. The analytical force of this argument draws on the distinction between neutral and non-neutral money, epitomised in the interest rate criterion, and in the identification of violations of this criterion as the ultimate cause of the business cycle. This is the only sense in which it is proper to speak, in Hayek’s view, of a monetary explanation of the business cycle. With the introduction of money the tendency towards equilibrium prevalent in the static economy is replaced by the more complicated adjustment patterns of dynamic theory. Yet, among the various peculiarities that make the money economy differ from its static counterpart, the most systematic, and that most pertinent to the existence of the business cycle, is the effect of credit creation (or destruction) in causing an incongruity between investment and voluntary saving.

—Hansjoerg Klausinger, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 7, Business Cycles, Part I, by F. A. Hayek (Carmel, IN: Liberty Fund, 2017), 19.

Keynesian Theory ‘Demoted’ the Interest Rate from the Rôle of Guiding Intertemporal Allocation to that of Rewarding the Sacrifice of Liquidity

Keynesian theory depicted current income as proximately determined by current expenditure (Y = C + I + G) rather than by prior production. The ‘circular flow’ supplanted capital theory in macroeconomics. Current-period analysis displaced intertemporal analysis. The interest rate no longer played an equilibrating rôle. Left to its own devices, the economy could readily get stuck at a level of expenditure too small to achieve full employment. Smithies found it remarkable (note his apparently sneering use of quotation marks) that “Professor Hayek’s point of view is that a ‘real’ economy, if left to itself, will automatically achieve ‘equilibrium’ and that the disturbances that occur in real life are due to the subversive influence of money.” Keynesian theory, as Uhr put it, ‘demoted’ the interest rate from the rôle of guiding intertemporal allocation to that of rewarding the sacrifice of liquidity. Though it never became mainstream doctrine, some Keynesians nearly overthrew the idea that capital is scarce, and needs to be carefully allocated, in favour of the ‘secular stagnation’ thesis that remunerative uses of capital are or soon will be hard to come by.

—Lawrence H. White, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 12, The Pure Theory of Capital, by F. A. Hayek (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007), xxxi.

Hayek Admitted That His Business Cycle Theory Stands Or Falls On Sraffa’s Challenge to Forced Savings

The next problem concerned Hayek’s analysis of forced savings. Recall that in the Austrian theory of the cycle the lengthening of the structure of production, begun under a regime of forced savings, never gets completed. It is always the case that rising consumer prices signal firms that their earlier decision to employ more roundabout methods was in error. Firms abandon their incomplete capital projects and thereby precipitate the crisis. But isn’t it possible that the transition to more capital-intensive production methods could be completed in time? Might not the consumer goods produced by using more roundabout methods come onto line just as consumer demand begins to rise? In short, why must the traverse to a new structure of production always be interrupted before completion? 

Hayek admitted in his reply that “it is upon the truth of this point that my theory stands or falls.” And, sadly for Hayek, his insistence that the traverse could never be completed strikes many current commentators as being the chief deficiency of his theory of the cycle. The general consensus is that, while the scenario painted by Hayek is a possible one, he neither demonstrated its necessity nor gave adequate attention to the lags implicit in the process of adjustment that he portrayed. Hayek’s theory fits some, but not all, trade cycles: It is not, as Hayek purported it to be, a general theory of the cycle.

—Bruce Caldwell, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 9, Contra Keynes and Cambridge: Essays, Correspondence, by F. A. Hayek (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995), 38-39.

Keynes Suggested that Hayek Was Trapped in an Old Framework in which Only Changes in Credit Could Cause Savings to Differ from Investment

For Keynes’s second claim was that Hayek had misunderstood in a fundamental way the thrust of the Treatise [on Money], and that many of Hayek’s criticisms were therefore misdirected. What Hayek had missed, according to Keynes, was the claim that savings and investment could “get out of gear” within the framework of the Treatise [on Money] for any of a number of reasons that were independent of changes in the amount of credit in the system. Keynes suggested that Hayek’s misreading was due to his being trapped within an old framework, one in which only changes in credit could cause savings to differ from investment. Exposing Hayek’s flawed framework was then Keynes’s excuse for reviewing Prices and Production. . . . 

But Keynes’s claims notwithstanding, many sources of disturbance were possible within Hayek’s model, too. One reason that Keynes may have missed this point is that he focused on Prices and Production, where the origins of the cycle take a back seat to the changes in the structure of production that constitute the cycle. In the fourth chapter of his earlier (and at that time available only in German) Geldtheorie und Konjunkturtheorie [Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle], Hayek described things other than the actions of banks that could cause, in Keynes’s later terminology, the “marginal efficiency of capital” curve to shift. But Keynes was right to say that for Hayek, the effects of the shift will necessarily be transmitted through the credit system: It cannot be otherwise in a monetary economy.

—Bruce Caldwell, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 9, Contra Keynes and Cambridge: Essays, Correspondence, by F. A. Hayek (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995), 29-30.

Kirzner’s Defense of the Pure Time-Preference Theory of Interest Amounts to an Affirmation of “Methodological Essentialism”

It will be observed that our defense of PTPT [Pure Time-Preference Theory of Interest] against the bewilderment evinced by its various critics, amounts to a partial affirmation of what has sometimes been termed “methodological essentialism.” Several historians of thought have noticed that for Menger, economic science is a search for the reality underlying economic phenomena— for their essence (das Wesen). In a letter to Walras, Menger asks, “How can we attain to a knowledge of this essence, for example, the essence of value, the essence of land rent, the essence of entrepreneur’s profit . . . by mathematics?” This search for essences, reflecting a philosophical approach attributed to Aristotelian influence, would focus, then, not on the land rent paid for a particular parcel of real-estate in a particular year, but upon those essential features of land rent that would be common to all examples of the phenomenon. Similarly an essentialist approach to the interest problem as posed by Böhm-Bawerk would focus not on the list of elements which together determine specific interest rates, but on those elements upon which the interest phenomenon essentially depends, elements without which the phenomenon could in fact not exist. PTPT finds these essential elements for the interest phenomenon in time preference.

—Israel M. Kirzner, “The Pure Time-Preference Theory of Interest: An Attempt at Clarification,” in Essays on Capital and Interest: An Austrian Perspective, ed. Peter J. Boettke and Frédéric Sautet, The Collected Works of Israel M. Kirzner (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010), 163-164.