IS-LM Analysis Is Unable to Handle the EX ANTE Situation with Investment NOT Equal to Savings

The fundamental problem with the IS curve is that the equilibrium condition that defines the curve ignores the crucial difference between ex ante and ex post savings and investment. Ex post investment always equals savings, i.e., if investment is taking place, the savings must have come from somewhere. However, investment and savings need not be equal ex ante, and this is the point that IS-LM analysis is unable to handle. If the market rate of interest is inconsistent with the underlying preferences of savers and investors, then ex ante savings and investment may not be equal, triggering system-wide changes in prices and resource allocation, including labor. The whole Wicksellian / monetary equilibrium tradition we shall explore is centered around the way that market forces attempt to correct ex ante disequilibria, and the patterns of discoordination that such attempts can engender. For Wicksellians, it is ex ante disequilibria in the loanable funds market that explain movements in the price level and the resulting economic discoordination. However, by not addressing the possibility of ex ante disequilibrium, the IS-LM mechanism, and Keynes of The General Theory, overlook the entire set of problems that interest a post-Wicksellian, and to that extent Austrian, macroeconomist. 

—Steven Horwitz, introduction to Microfoundations and Macroeconomics: An Austrian Perspective, Foundations of the Market Economy (London: Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003), 8-9.

Forced Saving Occurs When Investment Expenditure Is Financed by Monetary Expansion

 According to Keynes, fiscal expansion would increase the price of ‘wage goods’ (that is, consumer goods) as a result of diminishing returns. This would simultaneously reduce real wages and increase profitability. Yet the concept of ‘forced saving’ was denied. Forced saving occurs when investment expenditure is financed by monetary expansion: as resources are reallocated to the production of capital goods, fewer commodities are available to consumers, and so forced saving takes place. Forced saving provided a key element in the Loanable Funds theory of interest rate determination. Later attempts to reconcile the Loanable Funds theory with Keynes’s Liquidity Preference theory are critically examined, and the latter is judged to be an unwarranted generalisation based upon very special circumstances.

—G. R. Steele, introduction to Monetarism and the Demise of Keynesian Economics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 4.

The Interest Rate Is a Function of the Supply and Demand for Loanable Funds

The business cycle is caused by the changes in the money supply that affect relative prices, and most importantly, the interest rate. One might consider why investors do not perceive these misleading price signals, and the reason is that individuals are not in a good position to separate out changes in prices due to changes in underlying supply and demand conditions from changes in prices due to monetary factors. In addition to the inevitable uncertainty about the future that has already been noted, as economic progress occurs, people may change their time preference. Increasing incomes can lead individuals to defer some consumption until later, saving more and consuming less in the present. This would increase the supply of loanable funds and lower the interest rate as a result of real changes in preferences rather than changes induced by monetary factors. Savers and investors can respond to market signals, but do not have a good way of separating interest rate changes caused by changes in time preference from changes due to monetary fluctuations. 

Garrison (2001) discusses changes in the interest rate that might be due to technological advances. If a new technology is developed for producing consumer goods, that technology might require investment in the short term to produce the goods that are anticipated to be profitable in the long run. An increase in investment demand will cause the interest rate to rise in the short run, but that short run might be a period of years before the technology is finally in place and able to deliver the consumer goods. This is an example with the larger point being that the interest rate is a function of the supply and demand for loanable funds. Many factors influence the supply and demand for loanable funds, and the effect of monetary expansion and contraction on the supply of loanable funds is only one factor. Entrepreneurs will, of course, try to discern and separate monetary causes for fluctuations in the interest rate from other causes, but in a complex economy nobody can do this perfectly. Market participants can see the actual market rate but can only conjecture about the importance of various factors that cause that rate to be at its current level. 

—Randall G. Holcombe, Advanced Introduction to the Austrian School of Economics, Elgar Advanced Introductions (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014), 80-81. 

Non-Austrian Views of the Business Cycle View a Booming Economy as a Healthy One

Rothbard (1963), taking an Austrian school approach, describes the cause of the Great Depression as the result of malinvestment that occurred during the 1920s. Monetary expansion during the 1920s led to the boom period described by Mises and Hayek. The Keynesian explanation for the Depression is that aggregate demand declined, largely due to the volatility of investment demand that suffered a substantial reduction after the stock market crash of 1929. The monetarist explanation was that because of problems with the banking system, the money supply declined precipitously following the 1929 stock market crash, and that monetary contraction turned what would have been a much less severe recession into the Great Depression. 

The Austrian explanation distinguishes itself by tracing the causal factors back to malinvestment during the upturn in the cycle. The problems leading to the business cycle occur during the upturn, and the downturn is the recovery phase, during which dislocations occur as people reallocate their resources away from unsustainable uses, as Horwitz (2000) notes. The significance of malinvestment as a cause of the downturn naturally focuses attention on the importance of recognizing the heterogeneity of capital. The Keynesian, monetarist and more recent general equilibrium models of the business cycle do not see the causes as being created by malinvestment prior to the downturn because those models do not account for the heterogeneity of capital. Non-Austrian views of the business cycle view a booming economy as a healthy one, whereas the Austrian school sees the downturn as the inevitable consequence of malinvestment during the boom phase.

—Randall G. Holcombe, Advanced Introduction to the Austrian School of Economics, Elgar Advanced Introductions (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014), 80. 

Coase’s Transaction-Cost Theory of the Firm Can Be Interpreted as Attempting to Strengthen the Argument for Market Socialism

 Instead, however, Coase chooses a very different approach, in which the market’s resource allocation, in accordance with Salter’s and Plant’s teachings, is efficient but in which it appears costly to use the price mechanism. Doing this, Coase formulates an argument that seems intended to undermine Mises’s case for free-market resource allocation by showing that the cost of using the price mechanism makes it imperfect (costly) for coordinating production. While the allocative result of the price mechanism may be superior (even with transaction costs), this is insufficient, since the assumption often made in economic theory—that prices are known—“is clearly not true of the real world.” This identification is well in line with Coase’s lifelong contribution to economic research, which has been dedicated to “the study of the working of the real world economic system.”

The ‘costly market’ approach plays well into the market socialists’ argumentation for the possibility of socialism, as discussed above, and their proposed schemes to overcome Mises’s calculation problem by providing socialism with centrally regulated, advertised (therefore easily known) list prices. Coase's transaction-cost theory of the firm can, in this sense, be interpreted as attempting to undermine the theory of capitalism and, at the same time, strengthen the argument for market socialism.

Really, Coase’s argument essentially echoes that of Taylor (1929): socialism (or the firm) can be as efficient as capitalism, yet have the benefit of being less costly. Coase’s concurrent work on accounting appears to strengthen this interpretation.

—Per L. Bylund, “Ronald Coase’s ‘Nature of the Firm’ and the Argument for Economic Planning,” Journal of the History of Economic Thought 36, no. 3 (September 2014): 320-321.

Although Taken for Granted, the Business Firm as an Economic Phenomenon Is One of the Most Complicated to Explain

 It may not be much of an exaggeration to claim that many of science’s great achievements have been of one of two kinds: it has shown that what was believed to be impossibly complex is in fact the result of a rather simple mechanism or process; and it has shown that what was thought of as simple or taken for granted was in fact quite complicated or even beyond our ability to explain. In line with the latter, it indeed seems often to be the case that what appears to be most glaringly obvious may sometimes be the very hardest to explain. The business firm as an economic phenomenon clearly falls in this category. 

To the non-academic, the firm presents little problem. Perhaps this is the reason why it was taken for granted for so long also in the study of economics. While the firm has often been present in different forms of analyses and theorising, it has far less often been subject to scrutiny. Adam Smith famously discusses the division of labour exemplified by work with a pin factory and Karl Marx similarly discusses the use and exploitation of labour within factories, to mention only two noteworthy examples. Yet neither of them ask the fundamental question of why there are firms. This, in fact, is almost exclusively the case for economists and social theorists for all but the last century. If the modern account of the recent history of economics is to be trusted, this question remained unasked until a very young Ronald H. Coase posed it in his Nobel-winning article ‘The Nature of the Firm’ published in 1937. Coase’s article was not the first to study firms, but it is generally regarded as the beginning of the modern theory of the firm literature — the tradition that asks why there are firms.

—Per L. Bylund, introduction to The Problem of Production: A New Theory of the Firm, Routledge Advances in Heterodox Economics 27 (London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2016), 1.

The Ergodic Presumption Is the Essential Foundation of Classical Efficient Market Theory

To grasp Keynes’s theory, one must first consider the contrasting framework, accepted down to our day by most economists, which Keynes rejected. In that view, everything is fine as long as prices and wages are flexible. If prices can adjust to changes in business expectations, why should there ever be a serious problem? Davidson contends that this way of thinking rests on a flawed assumption. Advocates of the standard model imagine that accurate markets exist, not only for present transactions, but for future contracts as well.

The assumption of accurate futures markets in turn rests on a hypothesis, which Davidson deems the crucial principle of neoclassical economics.

Since drawing a sample from the future is not possible, efficient market theorists presume that probabilities calculated from already existing past and current market data are equivalent to drawing a sample from markets that will exist in the future . . . the presumption that data samples from the past are equivalent to data samples from the future is called the ergodic axiom. Those who invoke this ergodic assertion argue that economics can be a “hard science” like physics or astronomy only if the ergodic axiom is part of the economist’s model. . . . The ergodic presumption is the essential foundation of classical efficient market theory.

Readers will not be surprised to learn that Samuelson, who evidently ranks high on the list of Davidson ’s villains, fervently endorses the ergodic axiom. 

Keynes saw the fallacy in this assumption. The future is in fact radically uncertain.

The classical ergodic axiom, which assumes that the future is known and can be calculated as the statistical shadow of the past, was one of the most important classical assumptions that Keynes rejected. . . . For decisions that involved potential large spending outflows or possible large income inflows that span a significant length of time, [Keynes argued that] people “know” that they do not know what the future will be. They do know that for these important decisions, making a mistake about the future can be very costly . . . 

Keynes, the author of A Treatise on Probability, was well equipped to make this fundamental point. 

Davidson is right that Keynes has here scored heavily against neoclassical economics. But the uncertainty of the future hardly suffices to establish the validity of the Keynesian system. For one thing, Austrian economics also emphasizes the uncertainty of the future. It is constantly stressed by Mises, who goes so far as to claim that the uncertainty of the future is a praxeological law, deduced from the action axiom. Davidson never so much as mentions the Austrian School in this book. For him, only the efficient-market economists, with their false ergodic assumption, and their Keynesian rivals count.  

—David Gordon, review of The Keynes Solution: The Path to Global Economic Prosperity, by Paul Davidson, The Mises Review 15, no. 3 (Fall 2009), under “The Discussion of Chapter 19 of the General Theory,” https://mises.org/library/keynes-solution-path-global-economic-prosperity-paul-davidson (accessed May 12, 2021).

Hayek Attempts to Resolve the Dilemma between Equilibrium Theory and the Disequilibrium Associated with Business Cycles

In Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, Hayek draws attention to the deficiency of equilibrium theory to explain “why a general disproportionality between supply and demand should arise.” The solution to this problem, Hayek notes, is not to be found by changes originating within the equilibrium construct nor by the methods of equilibrium analysis since “the essential means of explanation in static theory . . . is the assumption that prices supply an automatic mechanism for equilibrating supply and demand.” In resolving the dilemma between equilibrium theory and the disequilibrium associated with business cycles, Hayek argues that it is only the introduction of money that can provide a “new determining cause” capable of explaining “the difference between the course of events described by static theory . . . and the actual course of events.” The introduction of money, Hayek tells us, “does away with the rigid interdependence and self-sufficiency of the ‘closed’ system of equilibrium and makes possible movements which would be excluded from the latter.” . . . 

My remarks perhaps come in somewhat sharper relief if we examine Hayek’s discussion of neutral money in the Appendix to Lecture IV of Prices and Production. In general, neutral money is employed by Hayek to describe a monetary economy that has achieved a constellation of relative prices as if money were not present; it would involve an economy fully specifiable by equilibrium theory. In reflecting on the suitability of the neutral money concept as an objective of monetary policy, Hayek says:

. . . the term points, of course, only to a problem, and does not represent a solution. . . . The necessary starting point for any attempt to answer the theoretical problem seems to me to be the recognition of the fact that the identity of demand and supply, which must necessarily exist in the case of barter, ceases to exist as soon as money becomes the intermediary of the exchange transaction. The problem then becomes one of isolating the one-sided effects of money . . . which will appear when, after the division of the barter transaction into separate transactions, one of these takes place without the other complementary transaction. In this sense, demand without corresponding supply, and supply without a corresponding demand, evidently seem to occur. . . . 

—William N. Butos, “Hayek and General Equilibrium Analysis,” Southern Economic Journal 52, no. 2 (October 1985): 338.

Philosophically, Friedmanism Would Destroy Money Itself and Reduce Us to the Chaos and Primitivism of the Barter System

There is no question about the fact that the present international monetary system is an irrational and abortive monstrosity, and needs drastic reform. But Friedman’s proposed reform, of cutting all ties with gold, would make matters far worse, for it would leave everyone at the complete mercy of his own fiat-issuing state. We need to move precisely in the opposite direction: to an international gold standard that would restore commodity money everywhere and get all the money-manipulating states off the backs of the peoples of the world. 

Furthermore, gold, or some other commodity, is vital for providing an international money—a basic money in which all nations can trade and settle their accounts. The philosophical absurdity of the Friedmanite plan of each government providing its own fiat money, cut loose from all others, can be seen clearly if we consider what would happen if every region, every province, every state, nay every borough, county, town village, block, house, or individual would issue its own money, and we then had, as Friedman envisions, freely fluctuating exchange rates between all these millions of currencies. The ensuing chaos would stem from the destruction of the very concept of money—the entity that serves as a general medium for all exchanges on the market. Philosophically, Friedmanism would destroy money itself, and reduce us to the chaos and primitivism of the barter system. 

One of Friedman’s crucial errors in his plan of turning all monetary power over to the State is that he fails to understand that this scheme would be inherently inflationary. For the State would then have in its complete power the issuance of as great a supply of money as it desired. Friedman’s advice to restrict this power to an expansion of 3–4% per year ignores the crucial fact that any group, coming into the possession of the absolute power to “print money,” will tend to . . . print it!

 —Murray N. Rothbard, “Milton Friedman Unraveled,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 16, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 50.

“The Business Cycle Largely a ‘Dance of the Dollar’” (1923) Set the Model for the “Purely Monetary” Theory of the Business Cycle

In keeping with this outlook, Irving Fisher wrote a famous article in 1923, “The Business Cycle Largely a ‘Dance of the Dollar’”—recently cited favorably by Friedman—which set the model for the Chicagoite “purely monetary” theory of the business cycle. In this simplistic view, the business cycle is supposed to be merely a “dance,” in other words, an essentially random and causally unconnected series of ups and downs in the “price level.” The business cycle, in short, is random and needless variations in the aggregate level of prices. Therefore, since the free market gives rise to this random “dance,” the cure for the business cycle is for the government to take measures to stabilize the price level, to keep that level constant. This became the aim of the Chicago School of the 1930s, and remains Milton Friedman’s goal as well. 

Why is a stable price level supposed to be an ethical idea, to be attained even by the use of governmental coercion? The Friedmanites simply take the goal as self-evident and scarcely in need of reasoned argument. But Fisher’s original groundwork was a total misunderstanding of the nature of money, and of the names of various currency units. In reality, as most nineteenth century economists knew full well, these names (dollar, pound, franc, etc.) were not somehow realities in themselves, but were simply names for units of weight of gold or silver. It was these commodities, arising in the free market, that were the genuine moneys; the names, and the paper money and bank money, were simply claims for payment in gold or silver. But Irving Fisher refused to recognize the true nature of money, or the proper function of the gold standard, or the name of a currency as a unit of weight in gold. Inst4ead, he held these names of paper money substitutes issued by the various governments to be absolute, to be money. The function of this “money” was to “measure” values. Therefore, Fisher deemed it necessary to keep the purchasing power of currency, or the price level, constant. 

This quixotic goal of a stable price level contrasts with the nineteenth-century economic view—and with the subsequent Austrian School. They hailed the results of the unhampered market, of laissez faire capitalism, in invariably bringing about a steadily falling price level. For without the intervention of government, productivity and the supply of goods tends always to increase, causing a decline in prices. Thus, in the first half of the nineteenth century—the “Industrial Revolution”—prices tended to fall steadily, thus raising the real wage rates even without an increase of wages in money terms. We can see this steady price decline bringing the benefits of higher living standards to all consumers, in such examples as TV sets falling from $2000 when first put on the market to about $100 for a far better set. And this in a period of galloping inflation. 

—Murray N. Rothbard, “Milton Friedman Unraveled,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 16, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 46-47.

The Key Problem with Friedman’s Fisherine Approach Is the Same Orthodox Separation of the Micro and Macro Spheres

The third major feature of the New Deal program was proto-Keynesian: the planning of the “macro” sphere by the government in order to iron out the business cycle. In his approach to the entire area of money and the business cycle—an area on which unfortunately Friedman has concentrated most of his efforts—Friedman harks back not only to the Chicagoans, but, like them, to Yale economist Irving Fisher, who was the Establishment economist from the 1900s through the 1920s. Friedman, indeed, has openly hailed Fisher as the “greatest economist of the twentieth century,” and when one reads Friedman’s writings, one often gets the impression of reading Fisher all over again, dressed up, of course, in a good deal more mathematical and statistical mumbo-jumbo. Economists and the press, for example, have been hailing Friedman’s recent “discovery” that interest rates tend to rise as prices rise, adding an inflation premium to keep the “real” rate of interest the same; this ignores the fact that Fisher had pointed this out at the turn of the twentieth century. 

But the key problem with Friedman’s Fisherine approach is the same orthodox separation of the micro and macro spheres that played havoc with his views on taxation. For Fisher believed, again, that on the one hand there is a world of individual prices determined by supply and demand, but on the other hand there is an aggregate “price level” determined by the supply of money and its velocity of turnover, and never the twain do meet. The aggregate, macro, sphere is supposed to be the fit subject of government planning and manipulation, again supposedly without affecting or interfering with the micro area of individual prices.

—Murray N. Rothbard, “Milton Friedman Unraveled,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 16, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 45-46.

Friedman and Schwartz’s Case That the Demand for Money (the Inverse of Velocity) Is Constant Is Statistical Legerdemain (a Sleight of Hand)

For many years I [Joseph T. Salerno]—and other Austrians—have had to endure charges by monetarists that Murray Rothbard fudged the data to increase monetary growth rates during the 1920s in order to portray it as an inflationary decade. As I argued in an exchange with eminent monetary historian Richard Timberlake these allegations are baseless. So, now it is with delicious irony that I draw your attention to an explosive article by three econometricians thoroughly debunking the empirical claim made by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz that the velocity of money in the U.S. has exhibited long-run stability for more than a century leading up to 1975. 

Neil Ericsson, David Hendry, and Stedman Hood argue that dubious “data adjustment” in Friedman and Schwartz’s empirical models “dramatically reduced apparent movement of the velocity of circulation of money and . . . adversely affected the constancy and fit of his estimated money demand models.” In other words, Friedman and Schwartz’s empirical case that the demand for money (the inverse of velocity) is constant, which Friedman and Schwartz painstakingly elaborated in three statistical tomes published from 1963 to 1982 and which is the linchpin of monetarism, has been exposed as statistical legerdemain. 

Friedman and Schwartz adjusted the raw data to account for: 1. the sudden onset of rapid developments of financial instruments and institutions in the U.S. economy compared to the U.K. economy; and 2. short-run fluctuations in velocity associated with business cycles. In adjusting for “changing financial sophistication,” Ericsson et al. point out, Friedman and Schwartz added a linear trend of 2.5% on money supply observations prior to 1903, but made no trend adjustment at all to the data after that year. In the process, they “adjusted” the money stock for 1867 from its raw or unadjusted value of $1.28 billion to $3.15 billion. This is a phantom increase of 246% on the observed money stock! The result of this trend adjustment was to substantially suppress the effect of the precipitous decline in observed velocity of more than 50% from the early 1870s to 1903 on its variability over the entire period studied (1867-1975). Thus although the adjustment applies to only 30% of the period studied, it accounts for almost 75% of the total variance of velocity.

—Joseph T. Salerno, “Milton Friedman Debunked—by Econometricians,” Mises Wire, entry posted May 12, 2017, https://mises.org/wire/milton-friedman-debunked-econometricians (accessed April 16, 2021).

The Parallels between the Myth of the Laissez-Faire Hoover and the Myth of the Do-Nothing Fed Are Striking

In addition to the myth of the laissez-faire Herbert Hoover, another popular theory of the Great Depression blames the do-nothing Federal Reserve. Ironically, this interpretation comes, not from Big Government critics of the free market, but instead from none other than Milton Friedman and his monetarist followers. Just as modern-day Keynesians urge the government to “avoid the mistakes of Hoover” by running up massive deficits, so too do modern monetarists urge the Fed to “avoid the mistakes of the Depression” by injecting massive amounts of reserves into the banking system. 

The parallels between the myth of the laissez-faire Hoover and the myth of the do-nothing Fed are striking. Just as Hoover engaged in unprecedented “stimulus” through his fiscal policies, so too did the Fed—starting immediately after the stock market crash in 1929—engage in unprecedented “easy money” policies. Because the massive budget deficits eventually forced Hoover to reverse course and raise taxes (in 1932), modern Keynesians say Hoover didn’t borrow-and-spend enough. Similarly, because a gold outflow from the country eventually forced the Fed to reverse course and tighten the money supply (in late 1931), the monetarists say the Fed didn’t inflate enough. But in both cases, the question remains: If budget deficits and cheap money were the right medicine, why was the Depression still getting worse, two years into these unprecedented fiscal and monetary remedies?

—Robert P. Murphy, “Did the Tightwad Fed’s Deflation Cause the Great Depression?” in The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Great Depression and the New Deal (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2009), 63-64.

New Keynesian Views on Monetary Theory and Policy Are More Fallacious Than Those of Their Predecessors

The essential fallacy of John Maynard Keynes and his early disciples was to cultivate the monetary equivalent of alchemy. They believed that paper money was a suitable means to alleviate the fundamental economic problem of scarcity. The printing press was, at any rate under certain plausible conditions of duress, a substitute for hard work and savings and cutting prices. 

The self-styled new Keynesians have not at all abandoned this fallacy and they therefore do not differ in any essential respect from the old Keynesians, in spite of the pains they take to distinguish themselves from the latter. The new Keynesian recommendation for monetary policy is to “stabilize the growth of aggregate demand.” In plain language this means that the monetary authorities should never stop flooding the economy with paper money. Recognizably, this is the core tenet of the old Keynesian monetary program, which in itself had been nothing but even older fallacies clothed in the new language of aggregate analysis. 

In many respects, new Keynesian views on monetary theory and policy seem to be even more fallacious than those of their predecessors. Whereas Keynes and his immediate followers were still trained in the old-fashioned art of economic reasoning, the new Keynesians are macro economic purebreds. Their expertise lies more or less exclusively in the field of modeling. As with the macroeconomics profession in general, they are devoted to a positivistic methodology, putting all their energies into modeling quantitative relationships among things that are the result of human action, rather than into the analysis of human action itself. Not surprisingly, therefore, their “science” of the economy resembles a hotchpotch of educated guesswork, conventions, and fictions, all designed to make the problems under consideration amenable to mathematical treatment. 

—Jörg Guido Hülsmann, “New Keynesian Monetary Views: A Comment,” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 6, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 73.

The Textbook Rendition of the Short-Run Phillips Curve Dynamics Clashes with the Empirical Record and with a Fundamental Proposition of Monetarism

Textbook writers and even many self-identified monetarists have taken this short-run/long-run Phillips curve analysis to be the monetarists’ account of the market mechanisms that cause a money-induced boom to go bust. Much more plausibly, however, Friedman’s presidential address was intended only as immanent criticism of the views held by his Keynesian-oriented contemporaries. Many saw the Keynes-inspired downward-sloping Phillips curve as an enduring trade-off between inflation and unemployment, a virtual menu of policy choice for left-leaning politicians willing to put up with inflation in order to reduce unemployment and for right-leaning politicians willing to put up with unemployment in order to reduce inflation. Friedman’s message was simply that there is no long-run trade-off. 

The common textbook rendition of the short-run Phillips curve dynamics actually clashes both with the empirical record and with a fundamental proposition of monetarism. The low unemployment rate during the boom depends on wage rates lagging behind rising output prices. This sequence would mean that real wage rates are relatively low during the boom. But the notion of low real wages during credit-induced booms has no empirical support. (In the Austrian view, the artificially cheap credit increases investment, increases the demand for labor, and hence increases the real wage rate. In fact, the higher real wages are in large part responsible for the political popularity of credit-induced booms). 

Not long after Friedman offered his criticism of the Phillips curve as a menu of choice, he set out ten fundamental propositions of monetarism, which included the proposition that a monetary expansion causes quantities (output and, as a virtual prerequisite, employment) to increase first and prices only later. With this sequence, of course, it cannot be the rising prices that, being differentially perceived by employers and employees, are responsible for increased employment and output. Friedman actually finessed the issue of “quantities then prices” versus “prices then quantities” in his presidential address, portraying the latter as an extra boost during a later phase of the adjustment process. But it was exclusively the “prices then quantities” sequence that became the standard textbook version, formalized by Robert E. Lucas Jr. as a monetary misperception theory of the business cycle. In any case, the “quantities then prices” understanding, which Friedman favored, is evidently not strong enough to show up in his highly aggregative monetarist framework as an empirically verifiable boom-bust sequence.

—Roger W. Garrison, review of Alchemists of Loss: How Modern Finance and Government Regulation Crashed the Financial System, by Kevin Dowd and Martin Hutchinson, The Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy 16, no. 3 (Winter 2011/2012): 444-445.

Irresponsible Monetary Policy Eventually Leads to an Increase in the Natural Rate of Unemployment

As Bellante and Garrison (1988) remind us, Friedman acknowledges that irresponsible monetary policy would eventually lead to an increase in the natural rate of unemployment. Two of Friedman’s papers (1976 and 1977) suggested the potential existence of a positively sloped Phillips curve. But in neither case did Friedman reconsider his model of dynamic monetary theory in light of his empirical work. 

In his Nobel lecture, Friedman acknowledged that additional research was needed to resolve the inconsistency between the monetarist Phillips curve and empirical data. He anticipated that this “third stage” of the research into the relationship between inflation and unemployment would only be successful if a way was found to incorporate political factors:

In recent years, higher inflation has often been accompanied by higher not lower unemployment, especially for periods of several years in length. A simple statistical Phillips curve for such periods seems to be positively sloped, not vertical. The third stage is directed at accommodating this apparent empirical phenomenon. To do so, I suspect that it will have to include in the analysis the interdependence of economic experience and political developments. It will have to treat at least some political phenomena not as independent variables—as exogenous variables in econometric jargon—but as themselves determined by economic events—as endogenous variables [. . .]. The third stage will, I believe, be greatly influenced by a third major development—the application of economic analysis to political behavior, a field in which pioneering work has also been done by Stigler and Becker as well as by Kenneth Arrow, Duncan Black, Anthony Downs, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and others. (1977, p. 470)

In my doctoral thesis (Ravier, 2010), I called this “Friedman’s dilemma” because Friedman observed an empirical reality his own analytical framework was unable to explain. Friedman observes a positively sloped Phillips curve and a long-term effect of monetary stimulus which is not neutral in real terms. Both are inconsistent with his own theories. Instead he provides evidence confirming the work of Robert Lucas (1973) and, more recently, William Niskanen (2002). Robert Mulligan (2011) has demonstrated the connection between Niskanen’s article and Austrian business cycle theory.

—Adrián O. Ravier, “Dynamic Monetary Theory and the Phillips Curve with a Positive Slope,” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 16, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 172-173.

The Method Used to Develop the Phillips Curve Is More Akin to That of the German Historical School

The Phillips curve is named after the British economist A. W. Phillips (1958), who in a pathbreaking article investigated the statistical relationship in the UK between the annual rate of change of money wages and the annual rate of unemployment. Later versions of the Phillips curve examined the relationship between unemployment or the rate of growth of output and, alternatively, the rate of change of product prices, and the deviation between actual and ‘expected’ inflation. 

Inasmuch as the Phillips curve is an important component of mainstream economics, its development remains a curious paradox. Logical positivism is the conventional methodology of the neoclassical mainstream and this methodological doctrine has been severely criticized by economists working within the Austrian methodological perspective. Logical positivism involves the construction of theory that is tested by empirical evidence. The resulting empirical evidence may lead to modification of the theory and further testing, but the initial theory construction always precedes empirical testing. The Phillips curve developed purely as an empirical relationship with only ad hoc theoretical rationalizations provided. Only later were attempts made to develop a theory that would ‘explain’ the statistical relationship. This method is more akin to that of the German historical school, of which criticism by the Austrian school has been much more severe. The series of currently recognized policy errors that followed from attempts to exploit the Phillips curve serves as an excellent but unfortunate example of the problems associated with ‘letting the facts speak for themselves.’

—Don Bellante, “The Phillips Curve,” in The Elgar Companion to Austrian Economics, ed. Peter J. Boettke (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1994), 372.

The Critical Difference between New Classicism and Austrianism Lies in Differing Treatments of the KNOWLEDGE PROBLEM

The New Classicists accept the Monetarist propositions about the long run and argue that the assumption of “rational expectations” allow those propositions to apply to the short run as well. In effect, the New Classicists deny the significance of Hayek’s distinction between two kinds of knowledge. Market participants behave “as if” they actually know the structure of the economy. They react to monetary expansions in ways that compensate for price and interest-rate distortions. So long as expectations about future price and interest-rate movements are not systematically in error, there will be no intertemporal discoordination, and no discoordination of any other kind that can be attributed to the monetary expansion. In this view, a Hayekian trade cycle anticipated is a Hayekian trade cycle avoided. 

The rational-expectations argument is nothing new to Austrian theory. In fact, Mises (1953) recognized the kernel of truth in the argument long before the appearance of John Muth’s (1961) classic article. He warned the advocates of inflationary finance against ignoring Lincoln’s dictum: You can’t fool all the people all the time. In the early 1940s Ludwig Lachmann (1977) called the Austrian theory into question on the basis of what was, in effect, a rational-expectations argument. The rise of the New Classicism in recent years has refocused attention on the role of expectations in trade cycle theory. Without doubt, the course of the trade cycle is influenced in a fundamental way by the expectations of market participants. But the idea of rational expectations is not quite the show stopper that the New Classicists believe it to be. Again, the critical difference between New Classicism and Austrianism lies in differing treatments of the knowledge problem. 

It is peculiar for economists to assume that market participants know, or behave “as if” they know, the structure of the economy. After all, economists have had disagreements among themselves for more than 200 years about how the economic system works. Some believe that the economy works in the manner envisioned by Keynes or by his many interpreters, some believe that the economy is more  accurately depicted by the Classical model, and some believe that the economic relationships identified by the Austrians are essential to the understanding of the economy’s structure. There are important differences even within each of these three theoretical frameworks, and there exist still other, more radical alternatives such as Marxism and modern Institutionalism. 

It would be an amazing feat for market participants either individually or collectively to single out not only the correct theoretical framework but also the parametric values that are currently applicable. And if they actually performed this feat (or behaved “as if” they had performed it), the question of just how they did it would be the most challenging question the economics profession has yet faced.

—Roger W. Garrison, “Hayekian Trade Cycle Theory: A Reappraisal,” Cato Journal 6, no. 2 (Fall 1986): 443-444.

Austrian Business Cycle Theory Incorporates Aspects of a Number of Alternative Theories, e.g., Classical, Phillips Curve etc.

At first, the Austrian theory of business cycles appears very different from other main schools of macroeconomic thought. Yet a comparison shows that it actually incorporates a number of features of alternative theories. Garrison (2001; Ch. 12) provides a useful—if stylized—overview, summarized in Figure 1. 

In the Classical view, the economy operates on the production possibilities frontier (ppf), and agents have a choice between consumption and investment, which therefore tend to move in opposite directions. Over time, higher investment implies faster growth, which leads to a ppf that moves up and to the right more quickly. A choice for higher immediate consumption tends to slow growth. In the Classical view, there is no room for short-term fluctuations, only secular growth. 

In the Keynesian view, the economy is generally not on the ppf. Left to its own devices, the economy suffers from a chronic lack of demand, leaving it in a continuous state of semi-depression. Expansionary economic policies can increase demand and move the economy towards the ppf. Note that investment and consumption generally move together, in response to increases and decreases in aggregate demand. 

Real business cycle theories see all fluctuations as caused by real shocks. Markets are assumed always to be in equilibrium, and there are no departures from the ppf. Business-cycle related movements that appear to take the economy off the original ppf are considered to be the result of movements of the ppf itself, driven mostly by stocks to productivity.

Theories that incorporate a Phillips curve postulate a (temporary) tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. An unanticipated monetary expansion will allow the economy to operate beyond the ppf, but only temporarily, as long as it takes prices to adjust. The policy-induced boom is unsustainable; eventually, prices will rise and the economy will settle back on the ppf. Expectations-augmented versions of the theory require a continuously accelerating rate of inflation to sustain production beyond the ppf. 

Austrian business cycle theory incorporates aspects of a number of these alternatives: it draws heavily on classical theory by stressing the preference-based tradeoff between consumption and investment, but acknowledges the potential for the economy to operate beyond the ppf, as in Phillips-curve based theories. But in Austrian theory, the economy does not simply return to the ppf after the boom. The initial credit-induced changes in investment were not based in preferences and thus prompted a mismatch between the structure of production and planned future consumption. This triggers a change in intertemporal relative prices, raising the interest rate, which triggers a recession. Attempts by the monetary authorities to stave off recession are doomed to failure; the economy needs time and unfettered interest-rate signals to readjust its capital base to the structure of demand. 

—Stefan Erik Oppers, “The Austrian Theory of Business Cycles: Old Lessons for Modern Economic Policy?” (working paper no. 02/2, International Monetary Fund, 2002), 14-15, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp0202.pdf.

Something Had Gone Wrong with the Steering Mechanism of Federal Reserve Policy and It Behooves Us to Know Why

The reason why all this deserves attention is that we now know that the Titanic of the US financial system in 1923 was even then on course for the iceberg of 1929. Something had gone wrong with the steering mechanism of Federal Reserve policy and it behooves us to know why. At several points in his review of US monetary policy in the early 1920s (chapter 2, this volume), Hayek raised warning flags, particularly in section six, which points to the lack of a coherent theoretical foundation. 

What went wrong? The Reserve Board was no longer able to use changes in the reserve ratio as the steering mechanism. “Under the present conditions, with gold embargoes in force in most foreign countries and the United States practically the only free gold market of the world, the movement of gold to this country does not reflect the relative position of the money markets nor does the movement give rise to corrective influences, working through exchanges, money rates, and price levels, which tend to reverse the flow. The significance which movements in the reserve ratios formerly possessed rested upon the fact that they were the visible indicators of the operation of the nicely adjusted mechanism of international finance. With this mechanism now inoperative, the ratios have lost much of their value as administrative guides. It has therefore been necessary for banking administration even in those countries that have been most successful in maintaining a connection with the gold standard to develop or devise other working bases.”

—Stephen Kresge, ed., editor’s introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 5, Good Money, Part I: The New World, by F. A. Hayek (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), 22.

Surprisingly, Hayek in 1937 Expressed a Preference for an International Central Bank over International Free Banking

In the choice between the two routes to a truly international monetary system, Hayek in 1937 expressed a preference for an international central bank over international free banking. This is surprising given the outlook on economic policy for which he was well known, a classical liberal appreciation for the profound limitations of government activism. 

The language Hayek used is even more surprising in light of his more recent (1973, 1988) critiques of “constructivist rationalism” in social thought. In the 1937 lectures, he spoke of “the ideal” of “a rationally regulated world monetary system,” and commented that “a really rational monetary policy could be carried out only by an international monetary authority, or at any rate by the closest cooperation of the national authorities and with the common aim of making the circulation of each country behave as nearly as possible as if it were part of an intelligently regulated international system.”

—Lawrence H. White, “Monetary Nationalism Reconsidered,” in Money and the Nation State: The Financial Revolution, Government and the World Monetary System, ed. Kevin Dowd and Richard H. Timberlake Jr. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 379.

Hayek’s Constancy of Nominal Spending Rule (Keep MV Constant) Made Him Doubt the Merits of the Gold Standard and Free Banking

Hayek noted that a hypothetical gold monetary system in which the money stock consisted exclusively of gold coins (without bank-issued money) would poorly approximate his norm because the stock of monetary gold would not adjust promptly to offset changes in velocity. Gold accumulated slowly from additional mining following a rise in the relative price of gold. Nor would a system with bank-issued money approximate it well, he thought, unless a central bank existed to promptly offset any changes in the volume of bank-issued money not warranted by velocity changes. Thus Hayek was more ambivalent than Mises regarding the merits of the gold standard and free banking. 

—Lawrence H. White, “The Roaring Twenties and Austrian Business Cycle Theory,” in The Clash of Economic Ideas: The Great Policy Debates and Experiments of the Last Hundred Years (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 83-84.

Hayek Wants NOT a Constant Money Supply BUT a Neutral Money Supply Insuring that There Will Be NO Monetary Causes of Price Changes

The Mises-Hayek business cycle theory led Hayek to the conclusion that intertemporal coordination is best maintained by constancy of nominal spending or “the total money stream.” In terms of the variables of Irving Fisher’s equation of exchange (MV=PQ), nominal spending is the money stock times its velocity of circulation, MV. In Prices and Production Hayek recommended that to keep MV constant the money stock M should vary to offset changes in the velocity of money V, but should be constant in the absence of changes in V. The price level P should be allowed to fall with growth in real income Q. As Hansen summarized the prescription:

The supply of money should, therefore, be kept constant, except for such increases or decreases as may be necessary to offset . . . changes in the velocity of circulation . . . Hayek wants, therefore, not a constant money supply, but a neutral money supply — one which will insure that there will be no monetary causes of price changes.

—Lawrence H. White, “The Roaring Twenties and Austrian Business Cycle Theory,” in The Clash of Economic Ideas: The Great Policy Debates and Experiments of the Last Hundred Years (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 83.

For Supply-Siders, Gold’s Market Value Is a Sensitive Indicator of Impending Changes in the Overall Price Level

Under the supply-siders’ preferred alternative, the Fed is obliged to target the price of a commodity, say gold, whose market value is believed to be a sensitive indicator of impending changes in the overall price level. For example, if the target price of gold is established at $400 per ounce and it starts to exhibit a tendency to decline below this level on the open market, it indicates to the Fed that there is a developing shortage of money and spending, which threatens to reduce prices throughout the economy. By purchasing gold or even Treasury securities from the public in exchange for newly-created dollars until the price of gold returns to its target level, the Fed automatically remedies the monetary shortage and thereby offsets the tendency of the price level to decline. On the other hand, a surfeit of cash balances in the economy [surfeit means an amount that is too large, or is more than is needed]   is indicated by upward pressure on the market price of gold. The Fed relieves this pressure by selling gold or securities to the public and, in the process, absorbs and extinguishes the excess dollars before the general price level can be driven up. 

—Joseph T. Salerno, “Two Traditions in Modern Monetary Theory: John Law and A. R. J. Turgot,” in Money: Sound and Unsound (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2010), 27. 

The Supply-Side Gold Price Rule Is Akin to the Keynesian Formula; Monetarists Also Share a Kinship to Supply-Siders Since Both Seek Price Stability

The school of supply-siders who favor a gold standard is led by eminent writers and politicians, such as Robert Mundell, Arthur Laffer, Jude Wanniski, and Congressman Jack Kemp. They all want the Federal Reserve to follow a “price rule,” that is, to stabilize the value of the dollar by holding the price of gold at a certain point or within a certain range. 

The Federal Reserve is to engage in open-market operations or adjust the discount rate to maintain the price of gold at a certain point or within a certain range. With a price rule of $300 to $400 an ounce, if the price approached $400, the Fed would contract its total volume of credit to exert downward pressures on the price of gold; when the price fell to $300, the Fed would expand credit and send the price of gold back up again. By stabilizing the gold price through credit expansion or contraction, all other prices would be stabilized in the end. 

The supply-side scheme of price rules for gold is a derivation of Irving Fisher’s scheme for stabilizing the purchasing power of money by way of a “commodity standard.” However, while Professor Fisher (1867-1947) wished to retain redemption in gold, although no longer at a fixed weight of gold, most supply-siders have no such immediate intention. They would merely observe the price of gold, and then manage Federal Reserve credit in reaction to price changes. 

In a sense, the gold price rule is akin to the Keynesian formula of full employment and economic growth through contra-cyclical credit manipulation; however, Keynesian managers expand and contract always with an eye on several indexes, especially those of employment and economic growth. The task of supply-siders is much simpler; they merely need to watch the price of gold. 

The monetarists may notice a kinship to supply-siders despite their heated debates. Both build their structures on the foundation of a money monopoly and legal tender force; both would try to stabilize economic life through currency adjustments. Monetarists seek stability by means of a steady rate of currency issue; supply-siders prefer a price rule that calls for prompt adjustments in the stock of money. Both seek price stability. 

Supply-siders seem to be alone in their great naïveté about the Federal Reserve System’s ability to hold the price of gold at any level. In 1934, after just ten years of Federal Reserve manipulation, the dollar was devalued from 1/20.67 of an ounce of gold to 1/35, which raised the price of gold from $20.67 an ounce to $35.00. The dollar has suffered two formal devaluations and countless “floating” devaluations since then, raising the price of gold from $35 per ounce to more than $300 today. 

—Hans F. Sennholz, Money and Freedom (Cedar Falls, IA: Center for Futures Education, 1985), 43-44.