Yet Iceland’s time had not yet run out. As Armann Thorvalddsson, himself a leading Icelandic banker, recognizes, “What eventually got us out of the situation was the fact that the world was still drowning in liquidity. Although the European bond market had had its fill of Icelandic bank exposure, money was available from other markets at a price.” Market participants realized that Icelandic banks still had access to funding and would not yet become illiquid. Moreover, the CBI increased interest rates (from 9 to 12.75 percent) to attract foreign funds and raise confidence. The króna stabilized and CDS spreads narrowed gradually, though they never reached their previous low levels. The collapse was prevented for the time being. Thanks to the ample liquidity in the interbank markets, the party could continue. From 2006 to 2007, asset prices soared, for everything from companies to wine to fine art. Everyone in Iceland seemed to become a millionaire. Even so, Icelandic banks became somewhat more cautious and tried to improve their liquidity situation. Landsbanki tried to increase its access to wholesale funding markets by tapping the internet deposit market with Icesave, an online retail bank that attracted billions of pounds when it opened in the UK. Kaupthing followed suit with its own internet deposit platform, Kaupthing Edge.
—Philipp Bagus and David Howden, Deep Freeze: Iceland’s Economic Collapse (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2011), 75-76.
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